A quick reminder of the UKSC Blog’s annual essay competition.

We’re looking for entries of between 500-1000 words on either: (a) What has been the most important Supreme Court case to date, and why? or (b) Is the Supreme Court independent?

First prize is publication of your article on the UKSC Blog, a week’s work experience at Olswang LLP (and the glory, obviously). We’ll also publish the articles of selected runners up. Entries should be in an informal “blog” style and should be send to the Editors by 5pm on Monday 27th Feburary.

The competition is open to anyone studying an undergraduate or post-graduate degree at a UK university.

The full rules are here. Happy writing!

*We’re not suggesting this is a game of chance, however.

The appellant had previously been convicted of drugs offences and was subject to a confiscation order.

After the appellant’s release from prison he acquired assets through legitimate means; a certificate of increase in the appellant’s realisable assets was obtained by the Crown. The appellant appealed the lawfulness of the certificate.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, with Lord Hope and Lady Hale dissenting in part. The transitional provisions implemented alongside the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 disapplied the entire POCA confiscation order regime (which would have applied to ‘after acquired assets’) in respect of offences committed prior to 24 March 2003, so accordingly the Drug Trafficking Act 1994, s 16 applied to the appellant’s circumstances. Nothing in the definition sections of the 1994 Act required s 16(2) to be construed as if it referred to the amount that might have been realised at the time the confiscation order was made. Parliament could have made it clearer had its intention been to exclude after-acquired assets from the scope of  s16 and deliberately left it open for the courts in order to deprive a defendant of their criminal gains on an ongoing basis irrespective of how they came by any increased wealth.

Lord Hope, dissenting (with the agreement of Lady Hale) disagreed on the basis that reading s 16(2) to include legitimate after-acquired assets could penalise a defendant for their own enterprise and hard work after their release from custody. The general principle of construction is that a statute should not be held to take away property rights without compensation unless the intention to do so is expressed in terms which are clear and unambiguous.

For the Court’s press summary, please download: Press Summary
For judgment, please download: [2012] UKSC 5
For a non-PDF version of the judgment, please visit: BAILII

Tuesday 21 February will see the beginning of a six day hearing for Test Claimants in the Franked Investment Income Group Litigation v Commissioners of the Inland Revenue& anr in front of a seven judge panel ( L Hope, L Walker, L Brown, L Clarke, L Dyson, L Sumption, L Reed).  Almost all of the FII Claimants are members of the British American Tobacco group of companies. The challenge relates to the basic rule of UK corporation tax that UK companies are not subject to corporation tax on dividends received from other UK companies, while dividends received from non-UK companies are subject to the tax but carry a right to a credit equal to the amount of foreign tax paid.

Four linked cases will also be starting on 21 February in Court Room 2 in front of L Phillips, L Hale, L Mance, L Kerr, and L Wilson. Lukaszewski v The District Court in Torun, Pomiechowski v District Court of Legunica, R (Halligen) v Secretary of State for the Home Department and Rozanski v Regional Court 3 Penal Department Poland all concern time limits for appeals in extradition cases and what constitutes ‘good notice of appeal’.

On Wednesday 22 February 2012 the Supreme Court will hand down judgment in R v Peacock.

The following Supreme Court judgments remain outstanding:

R v Waya, heard 5 May 2011.

Flood v Times Newspapers, heard 17 – 18 Oct 2011.

Lehman Brothers International v CRC Credit Fund Ltd and GLC Investments PLC Sub Fund, heard 31 October – 3 November 2011.

Ministry of Defence v AB & Ors, heard 14 – 17 November 2011.

BAI Ltd v Thomas Bates and Son Ltd, BAI Ltd v Durham, Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Zurich Insurance, Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Zurich Insurance Company and Adur District Council and Ors, Independent Insurance Company Ltd v Fleming and Anor, Municipal Mutual Insurance Company v Zurich Insurance Company and Ors, Excess Insurance Company Ltd v Edwards, Excess Insurance Company Ltd v Akzo Nobel UK Ltd and Excess Insurance Company Ltd v Amec plc, heard 5 – 14 December 2011.

In the matter of Peacock, heard 14 December 2011.

Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. v E.N.E. Kos 1 Ltd, heard 12 – 15 January 2012.

Homer v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police and Seldon v Clarkson Wright and Jakes (A Partnership), heard 17 – 20 January 2012.

Stanford International Bank Ltd (acting by its joint liquidators) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office, heard 23 – 25 January 2012.

PP v Secretary of State for the Home Department, (formerly VV [Jordan]), PP v SSHD, W & BB v SSHD and Z, G, U & Y v SSHD, heard 30 – 31 January 2012.

Assange v The Swedish Judicial Authority, heard 1 – 2 February 2012.

R (KM) (by his mother and litigation friend JM) v Cambridgeshire County Council, heard 7 – 9 February 2012.

The main changes include:

- amendments designed to improve the legibility and presentation of documents put before the court, in particular hearing bundles and volumes of authorities;

- new provisions (closely modelled on the Civil Procedure Rules used in the High Court and Court of Appeal) setting set out the appropriate procedure where a solicitor or agent has ceased to act for a party; and

- provided counsel for all the parties agree, they can make a request to the registrar to dispense with part or all of court dress.  The court will usually agree to the request.

See the Supreme Court website here for further detail on these changes.

Early life

Born in Scotland on 7 September 1956, Robert John Reed attended George Watson’s College in Edinburgh before studying at the University of Edinburgh in the School of Law, where he attained a First Class Honours LL.B, and won the prestigious Vans Dunlop Scholarship.  He then went on to Balliol College, Oxford University, where he undertook a Ph.D. He was admitted to the Faculty of Advocates in 1983 and embarked on a wide range of civil work. Lord Reed has two daughters with Jane Mylne, whom he married in 1988.

An esteemed Career

Lord Reed has had a very busy and colourful legal career.  He served as Standing Junior Counsel to the Scottish Education Department from 1988 to 1989, and then to the Scottish Office Home and Health Department until 1995 when he was appointed Queen’s Counsel.  In 1996 he became an Advocate Depute, and two years later was appointed as a Senator of the College of Justice and a judge of the Court of Session.  It was in 1998 that he was granted his judicial title, Lord Reed, and he served as a judge of the Court of Session for 13 years.

Lord Reed found himself involved in one of the most high profile cases of the modern judicial era, sitting in the Grand Chamber judgments in 1999 on the appeals of Robert Thompson and Jon Venables.  This was as part of his role as one of the United Kingdom’s ad hoc judges at the European Court of Human Rights.  Lord Reed’s involvement in European affairs did not end there: he acted as an expert adviser to the European Union Initiative with Turkey on Democratisation and Human Rights between 2002 and 2004.

Lord Reed was a member of the Advisory Board of the British Institute for International and Comparative Law from 2001 to 2006, has been Chairman of the Franco-British Judicial Co-operation Committee since 2005, and part of the UN Task Force on Access to Justice under the Aarhus Convention since 2006.

He was also the Vice-President of the EU Forum of Judges for the Environment between 2006 and 2008, serving as Vice-President in 2008 and 2009.  Further to this Lord Reed has taken on roles as Convener of Children in Scotland (a consequence of his involvement in the Thompson/Venables case); Visiting Professor of Law at Glasgow Caledonian University; Honorary Professor at the University of Glasgow; and Chairman of the Centre for Commercial Law at the University of Edinburgh. 

Lord Reed was appointed to the Inner House (First Division) in 2008, having previously been the principal judge of the Commercial Court.  Appointment to the Privy Council soon followed.

The Supreme Court

Lord Reed has in fact sat on the Bench of the UK Supreme Court once before, during the illness of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, and was correctly identified by legal commentator Joshua Rozenberg as “the firm favourite” to succeed the now late Lord Rodger. 

On 20 December 2011, after consultation across each of the Supreme Court’s three UK jurisdictions, the anticipated appointment of Lord Reed as a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom was confirmed.  He was sworn in on 6 February 2012.

Lord Phillips, President of the Supreme Court, said of the appointment, “Lord Reed brings depth of experience in Scots law and practice, as well as insights into the work of the European Court of Human Rights.  As I near the end of my time as President of this court, it is encouraging to be welcoming [someone] of such high calibre.”

The appointment was made by Her Majesty, The Queen at the advice of the Prime Minister and Lord Chancellor, following the recommendation of the independent selection committee.

In accepting his new post, Lord Reed commented, “I am honoured by my appointment as a member of a court which has a world-wide reputation and influence, and whose decisions affect all parts of the United Kingdom. I am conscious of the responsibility which that entails.”

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on 1 February 2012.   The Court of Appeal’s judgment in this case can be found here.

The appeal will be heard by the Supreme Court on 9 and 10 May 2012.

In 2005 the appellant made a request under the Freedom of Information Act 2001, s 1 for disclosure of the Balen Report, which was an independent report commissioned by the BBC on the impartiality of its coverage of Middle Eastern affairs, namely the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which was intended to be an internal briefing document. The BBC is subject to FOIA to a limited extent – under s 7(1) and Sch 1, the Act only applies to “information held for purposes other than those of journalism, art or literature” in relation to the BBC. The BBC therefore rejected the appellant’s request, maintaining that the report was for the purposes of journalism and so was outside the scope of the Act. The appellant began litigation which led to the House of Lords on a jurisdiction point, and then appealed to the Information Tribunal, contending that if information is held only partly for purposes other than journalism it is within the scope of FOIA. The Tribunal held that the Balen Report was within the scope of FOIA, as after it had been placed before the Journalism Board it was then predominantly held for purposes other than journalism. This was overturned by Irwin J and that decision then upheld by the Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. Lords Phillips, Walker, Brown and Mance dismissed it on the basis that even if information was held only partly for the purposes of journalism, art or literature, it remained outside the scope of FOIA. Lord Wilson dismissed it on the basis that information held predominantly for the purposes of journalism was exempt, and that the Balen Report fell under this category of information. The Court of Appeal was correct in deciding that once it was established that the information was held to any significant degree for the purposes of journalism, it remained exempt even if the information was held for any other purposes. The legislative purpose of FOIA is to promote an important public interest in access to information about public bodies; but there is a powerful public interest that the public service broadcasters, no less than the commercial media, should be free to gather, edit and publish news and comment on current affairs without the inhibition of an obligation to make public disclosure of or about their work. The purpose of the designation would have failed if the coexistence of other non-journalistic purposes resulted in the loss of immunity.

The argument under ECHR, art 10 was dismissed, noting the body of jurisprudence defining the nature of the right was not imposing positive obligations on a State to disseminate information, but prohibits a government from restricting a person from receiving information willingly imparted.

For the Court’s press summary, please download: Press Summary
For judgment, please download: [2012] UKSC 4
For a non-PDF version of the judgment, please visit: BAILII

Background

This case arises out of the suicide of a 24 year old woman, Melanie Rabone, in April 2005 Melanie had a history of depression and self-harm when she was voluntarily admitted onto the psychiatric ward at Stepping Hill Hospital in April 2005. Although her admission was voluntary, it was noted that if she attempted or demanded to leave, she should be assessed for detention under the Mental Health Act 1983. Melanie was released for home leave on 19 April 2005, despite the concerns of her parents. The day after Melanie was released she hanged herself from a tree in a park near to her house.

For the full background of the case and previous decisions see the case preview here.

Supreme Court Judgment

The Supreme Court unanimously allowed the applicants’ appeal. The first issue was whether the state can owe an operational duty under article 2 ECHR to a hospital patient who is mentally ill but who is not formally detained under the MHA. Lord Dyson gave an extensive analysis of the jurisprudence in this area where the operational obligation was said to arise, which covers circumstances involving “dangers for which in some way the state is responsible”. [15-18] However, cases involving hospital deaths resulting from “casual acts of negligence” have not been found to engage the operational obligation (cf. Savage; Powell v United Kingdom [2000] 30 EHRR CD 362). The question for the Court was therefore whether the hospitals admitted “casual” negligence in the case of Melanie placed her in the Powell category of cases or whether the simple fact that she was a psychiatric patient, although not detained, meant that she fell into the class of cases where the duty did arise. [20]

Lord Dyson considered the “essential features” of cases where Strasbourg has found an operational duty. [21] There was no clear articulation of the principles in the case law but factors such as the assumption of responsibility for the individual’s welfare by the state, the victim’s vulnerability (where if sufficient may trigger the obligation on its own), and the nature of the risk in question were all relevant. [22-25] Whilst not a clear guide, there was a tendency towards expansion of the circumstances giving rise to the operational obligation. [25] Turning to the question whether the Court of Appeal was correct to place Melanie’s case in the Powell category, Lord Dyson accepted that there were differences between detained and voluntarily admitted psychiatric patients but that these “should not be exaggerated”. [27] Psychiatric patients, even when there “voluntarily” may only consent to medical treatment because they fear detention if they do not. There is also a distinction between a voluntary psychiatric patient and a patient voluntarily admitted for physical treatment:

“In the case of a suicide of a psychiatric patient, the likelihood is that, given the patient’s mental disorder, her capacity to make a rational decision to end her life will be to some degree impaired. The present case is a tragic illustration of this […]the very reason [Melanie] was admitted was because there was a risk that she would commit suicide from which she needed to be protected. On the other hand, the patient who undergoes surgery will have accepted the risk of death on the basis of informed consent. She may choose to avoid the risk by deciding not to go ahead with the medical treatment.” [30]

For these reasons, there was “no doubt” that Melanie was owed an operational duty “to take reasonable steps to protect her from the real and immediate risk of suicide”. [34] Lady Hale reached the same conclusion, although added that this situation was very different from that of an individual travelling to Switzerland to be assisted to commit suicide, which would not engage the operational obligation. [100] She also emphasised the particular vulnerability of those suffering from mental disorders. [102]

Having established that an operational duty was owed to Melanie, the next question was whether there was a “real and immediate risk” to her life at the time she was sent home. The NHS Trust had appealed against the Court of Appeal’s finding that had a duty existed, there was a breach because the risk was real and immediate. The Supreme Court rejected this submission. Lord Dyson held that although it is obviously more difficult to establish a breach of an operational duty than it is in respect of ordinary negligence, in this case the risk of Melanie committing suicide was “substantial or significant” and “not a remote or fanciful one”. [37-38] Lady Hale phrased the risk as “real and ever-present”. In light of the “nature and degree of the risk to her life, and the comparative ease of protecting her from it” her right to life was violated. [107]

The victim issue was shortly dealt with. It was well established in Strasbourg case law that family members could be victims and the remarks made by Lord Scott in Savage to the contrary were incorrect. [48] The more difficult question was whether they had ceased to be victims because they had previously settled the claim. The settlement for negligence under the 1934 Act had not precluded the applicants’ ability to bring a claim in their own right for a breach of Article 2 under the HRA. [58] Lord Dyson considered the Strasbourg case law on this point and concluded that no principle could easily be extrapolated but that Strasbourg had not adopted a strict approach to the interpretation of settlements but took a broad approach as to their true meaning. However, following Caraher v United Kingdom [2000] 29 HER CD 119, Lord Dyson held that “if relatives settle their domestic law claims arising from a death, they will generally cease to be victims in relation to a corresponding Convention claim”. [57]

Applied to the facts of the present case, the applicants had only settled a claim in respect of Melanie’s estate. They had not been able to bring a claim under the Fatal Accidents Act because Melanie was over 18 at the time of her death. Their claims for breaches of article 2 were made in their own right and the head of loss covered by that claim was not the same as that covered by the settlement. Accordingly they had not renounced their victim status by settling. The compensation offered to the applicants could not be said to be adequate redress; they had been offered compensation in relation to the claim on behalf of the estate but there had been no compensation for their bereavement. [59] As Lady Hale put it “[Melanie’s] parents have not ceased to be victims of this violation simply because the hospital has paid compensation to her estate. They are victims in their own right.” [108]

Although not necessary to consider the question of whether an admission on the part of the NHS trust that they had breached article 2 removed the applicants’ victim status, Lord Dyson noted that he would have found that the trust “in substance acknowledged their breach of the article 2 duty”. [72]

Comment

This case is important both in its articulation of the extent of the positive obligation incumbent in article 2 and the clarification of “victim status”. However, it is its analysis of the role of Convention rights domestically that is of particular significance. The finding that the operational duty first set out in Osman applies equally to voluntarily admitted psychiatric patients as it does to those sectioned under the MHA is to be welcomed. To hold otherwise would be a distinction without a difference and – as Lady Hale implied – the answer to the question seemed to be an obvious one:

“A hospital trust, in breach of its duty of care towards the patient, allowed a young woman, who was suffering from a severe depressive episode with psychotic symptoms and had been admitted a week earlier after a serious suicide attempt, to go on home leave for two days. The only support plan was the care of her parents who were not in favour of her being allowed home. The following day she hanged herself [. . . ] at last succeeding in the suicide which she had previously attempted and seriously threatened even more often. So why, some might ask, are we here?”

However, neither the House of Lords in Savage nor any of the post-Osman Strasbourg jurisprudence established that a voluntary psychiatric patient could trigger the operational duty under article 2. This case therefore provided the perfect opportunity for the Supreme Court to ask to what extent domestic courts are bound to follow Strasbourg authority. Section 2(1) of the HRA requires the courts to “take account” of Strasbourg case law. The principle espoused by Lord Bingham in R (Ullah) v Special Adjudicator [2004] 2 AC 323 should not mean that the domestic courts are bound to a course of inaction. As Lord Brown put it “[n]obody has ever suggested that, merely because a particular question which arises under the Convention has not yet been specifically resolved by the Strasbourg jurisprudence, domestic courts cannot determine it – in other words that it is necessary to await an authoritative decision of the ECtHR more or less directly in point before finding a Convention violation. That would be absurd.” [112].

Lord Brown’s interpretation of Ullah is important. He makes the point – rightly – that Ullah establishes that domestic courts should not “unwillingly” decide a case against a public authority unless necessary on a reading of existing Strasbourg case law. The corollary to that is that a court may in some circumstances give judgment against a public authority by providing rights to the individual more generous than provided for by the ECHR as long as to do so does not go beyond that “reasonably envisaged” within existing Strasbourg jurisprudence. On the other hand, where there is a Grand Chamber decision directly on point, it would not be prudent for the domestic court to decide to take the point differently merely because section 2 only requires it to take the decision into account. [113-114]

What Lords Brown and Mance seem to be pushing for is a more pragmatic approach to litigating Convention rights domestically. It is, of course, a common principle in international human rights law that states may afford greater protection to individual rights than the relevant international instrument. This could be either through statute or through the common law. Further, where Strasbourg case law is not consistent or has not provided a definitive answer to the question it would indeed be unsatisfactory – and probably contrary to what Parliament intended when it enacted the HRA – were domestic courts unable to give the necessary protection. For example, in this case there was very little helpful case law on the point of victim status for the Supreme Court to draw upon. Lord Mance saw this of symptomatic of any attempt to closely analyze individual section decisions of the Court as if they were binding precedents. [123]

These judicial remarks are well-timed. Lord Brown views the more pragmatic approach to Strasbourg case law as allowing the domestic courts to engage with Strasbourg while “bringing rights home”. It remains to be seen whether this will appease the Strasbourg critics or merely serve to shift their focus onto the Supreme Court.

This piece was originally posted on the FOI Man blog on 6 February, and is reposted here with thanks.

FOI Man looks at whether FOI requests can be made via Twitter, and concludes that it just isn’t a very good idea.

Earlier today, the UK’s Supreme Court started to use Twitter to much excitement (well, a little, and mostly from lawyers and geeky-types like me). Their first Tweet directed Twitter followers to their Twitter policy, available on the Supreme Court website.

Personally I was impressed that the Supreme Court actually had a Twitter policy. But the stirrings in my Twitter-stream were not about that. No, some of you were concerned about a short statement half way down the page:

“Sending messages to our Twitter feed will not be considered as contacting the Supreme Court for any official purpose (including the administration of cases or Freedom of Information requests).”

Oh dear. The thing is, this goes against advice provided by the Information Commissioner’s Office last year. After some deliberation, they came out with a statement saying that as long as the name of the Twitterer was clear (perhaps in their profile), and the information requested was clear, a Tweet could be a valid FOI request. And I agree with their analysis.

This all comes down to the definition of a request at section 8 of the FOI Act. To be valid, a request has to be in writing; it must provide the name and address of the requester; and it must describe the information that they are looking for. That’s all. It’s long been accepted that you could in principle make a request via text message. It’s not much of a stretch therefore to say that the same applies to Twitter.

In short, if someone does make a valid request to the Supreme Court via their Twitter address, and they ignore it, the requester could complain, and the Information Commissioner could slap them on the wrists for not complying with the Act. So their statement is pretty meaningless. And of course, because they’ve said it, there are now people up and down these isles submitting requests that they wouldn’t have done if the statement wasn’t there, just to prove a point.

My view on this is that using Twitter to make an FOI request is generally a waste of everybody’s time. Of course you can make a request through that route. But why? Firstly, it’s not the easiest thing to fit a request into 140 characters – there are ways round that (eg links), but if you’re going to link to another document why don’t you just use email in the first place? Secondly, if, like the Supreme Court, the authority clearly isn’t geared up to receive requests through that route, the chances are that your request won’t be seen. So then you complain. Well, woopy-doo (I believe I may have invented a new utterance of celebration, but bear with me) – you’ve successfully caught the authority out. But you haven’t got the information you wanted. So who wins here?

Somebody made the excellent point that it’s not a massive job to instruct whoever is maintaining the Twitter feed that they might get FOI requests and to be on the look out for them. That’s absolutely true. But in practice, most authorities probably aren’t aware that requests can come through that route. Jonathan Baines blogged last year about one surprising authority that didn’t seem to be (I promise you, you’ll love this, if you haven’t heard about it before). Also, even those of us who are aware – is this really a priority amongst the many messages that we want to get out to colleagues about FOI (and other things)? I have mentioned it to the people in my authority who maintain official Twitter accounts (and mine isn’t one before you unleash a thousand Tweets in my direction, those of you of a mischievous disposition – @foimanuk is a personal account), but I’m pretty sure that they will still be surprised the first time that it happens (that being the point – it’s still a very unusual thing to do).

And let’s be clear. There are lots of ways to make a valid FOI request that would most likely get you nowhere. In theory, next time your bins are being emptied, you could hand a written note to your waste collection operative, and as they’re providing a service for the council, that would arguably count as an FOI request. Good luck with that.

I’ve got no problem with FOI requests being made in any format or via any media in principle. Some authorities are very good at adjusting to new technologies and providing new ways for the public to interact with them. But many aren’t so good, or have limited resources to support additional communication portals. Is there really any point in sending a request through unusual media if the likelihood is that the authority won’t see your request?

Postscript, Tuesday 7 February

Shortly after I published this post on Monday, the Supreme Court Communications team tweeted the following, addressed to myself and Andy Mabbett, who Tweets as @pigsonthewing, (and who had first alerted me to the Twitter Policy):

“@pigsonawing [sic] @foimanuk Fair point! We’ll accept FOIs via Twitter and will amend our policy accordingly.”

And true to their word, the statement in their policy now reads:

“We would prefer to receive Freedom of Information requests via email or letter, in order to assist us in giving them a full response, but we note the Information Commissioner’s Office guidance on the validity of Twitter as a channel for receiving such requests and will handle them in accordance with that guidance.”

A swift and sensible response to the points raised, and it reflects well on the Communications team at the Supreme Court. Let’s hope there will be more moves towards openness in our court system. For more on that, I do recommend Adam Wagner’s post from earlier today.

From Wednesday 15 February 2012 over two days is the appeal of Tesco Stores Ltd v Dundee City Council, on appeal from the Court of Session (Scotland) which is being heard by Lords Hope, Brown, Kerr, Reed and Dyson. This concerns the granting by the respondent council of planning permission for a rival supermarket (Asda) 800 metres from the appellant’s supermarket. Scottish Executive policy guidance states that, subject to material considerations indicating otherwise, proposed sites should be considered in the following descending order of preference: (a) town centre, (b) edge of town, (c) other commercial centres identified in the development plan and (d) out of centre locations that can be accessed by various transport modes. In considering Asda’s application, the council accepted that the proposal failed to comply with this “sequential test” but given that it did not undermine the core land use strategies of the development plan and had a number of other planning, economic and social benefits, permission was granted. Tesco applied for judicial review of the council’s decision arguing that it had improperly interpreted and applied the development plan and that failed to consider its own policy, and this application was dismissed. On appeal to the Inner House of the Court of Session it was held the council was required only to apply the development plan and the sequential test to the extent that it was relevant, and in this case there were other much broader considerations that indicated permission should be given. It is for the Supreme Court to determine whether the council had improperly interpreted and applied the development plan, and also whether the interests of the Lochee district (the area of Dundee in which both plots are situated) require separate consideration. Here are the case details.

On Wednesday 15 February 2012 the Supreme Court will hand down judgment in Sugar (Deceased) v British Broadcasting Corporation & anor.

In the Privy Council this week is the appeal of Commissioner of Taxpayer Audit and Assessment v Cigarette Company of Jamaica Ltd (in Voluntary Liquidation), which will be heard on Wednesday 15 February by Lords Walker, Mance, Wilson, Sumption and Sir Patrick Coghlin. This appeal concerns whether transfers to the respondent from its holding company were genuine loans or merely described this way to avoid taxation on them. For more information case details are available here.

On Wednesday 15 February 2012 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council will hand down judgment in the following matters: Ian Seepersad and Roodal Panchoo v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago and E Anthony Ross v Bank of Commerce Trust and Savings Association Ltd.

The following Supreme Court judgments remain outstanding:

R v Waya, heard 5 May 2011.

Flood v Times Newspapers, heard 17 – 18 Oct 2011.

Lehman Brothers International v CRC Credit Fund Ltd and GLC Investments PLC Sub Fund, heard 31 October – 3 November 2011.

Ministry of Defence v AB & Ors, heard 14 – 17 November 2011.

BAI Ltd v Thomas Bates and Son Ltd, BAI Ltd v Durham, Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Zurich Insurance, Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v Zurich Insurance Company and Adur District Council and Ors, Independent Insurance Company Ltd v Fleming and Anor, Municipal Mutual Insurance Company v Zurich Insurance Company and Ors, Excess Insurance Company Ltd v Edwards, Excess Insurance Company Ltd v Akzo Nobel UK Ltd and Excess Insurance Company Ltd v Amec plc, heard 5 – 14 December 2011.

In the matter of Peacock, heard 14 December 2011.

Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. v E.N.E. Kos 1 Ltd, heard 12 – 15 January 2012.

Homer v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police and Seldon v Clarkson Wright and Jakes (A Partnership), heard 17 – 20 January 2012.

Stanford International Bank Ltd (acting by its joint liquidators) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office, heard 23 – 25 January 2012.

PP v Secretary of State for the Home Department, (formerly VV [Jordan]), PP v SSHD, W & BB v SSHD and Z, G, U & Y v SSHD, heard 30 – 31 January 2012.

Assange v The Swedish Judicial Authority, heard 1 – 2 February 2012.

R (KM) (by his mother and litigation friend JM) v Cambridgeshire County Council, heard 7 – 9 February 2012.